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Abstract  
Liberia’s 2017 elections represented a watershed moment in the country’s political 
history. In addition to completing the first democratic transfer of power from one 
president to another since 1944, it resulted in wide representation across many different 
parties and independents as well as high levels of legislative turn-overs. Additionally, 
these polls brought forward unprecedented numbers of party reconfigurations, increased 
levels of defections, and politicians/parties losing abysmally in presumed ethno-regional 
bases. In this article, we argue that Liberia currently exists in a post-war arena of “post-
party” politics where a profound disregard for parties is the norm, and in which the 
electorate and politicians alike forum shop for candidates and/or political configurations 
they presume will deliver the best results at national, sub-national and local levels. 
Although literature exploring electoral trends in Africa tends to over-emphasize ethno-
regionalism as a driver and constraint in the choices of voters and politicians, we 
demonstrate instead that Liberians make relatively informed, strategic decisions about 
political alliances and ballot casting thereby subverting allegiances to ethnicity and 
region. By further eschewing party loyalties, Liberians have gradually become astute 
forum shoppers in a political marketplace that makes running for office and voting 
complex undertakings. 
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The inauguration of George Manneh Weah as president of Liberia on 22 January 2018 was a 
watershed moment in the country’s political history. It commemorated nearly 15 years of peace 
following a protracted armed conflict, completed the first democratic transfer of power from one 
president to another since 1944, and also marked the first smooth transition from one political 
party to another since 1878.1 Truly momentous, Weah assumed the presidency with an unusual 
backdrop of a glittering professional football career, succeeding a similarly legendary Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf, Africa’s first democratically elected woman head of state. Arguably the most 
hotly contested post-war polls to date, the 2017 race for president, vice-president and House of 
Representatives combined boasted 2.1 million registered voters, 1,026 candidates (including 20 
presidential candidates), 2,080 precincts and 5,390 polling stations.2 The first round took place 
on 10 October 2017 yet a presidential run-off did not occur until 26 December 2017 because 
alleged electoral irregularities raised by the second, third and sixth placed candidates prompted 
lengthy judicial and institutional wrangling.3 Although the number of voters noticeably 
decreased for the run-off, turnout in the first round was impressive with 75.2% of registered 
voters exercising their franchise.4 This marked the highest percentage turnout in post-war 
years—against 74.9% in 2005 and 71.6% in 2011—and cemented the continued importance of 
elections for Liberians.5  
 
While it has been argued that elections alone do not a democracy make, Liberia’s three post-war 
presidential and legislative polls—particularly the most recent one in 2017—reveal a lot about 
how democratic consolidation has unfolded in Africa’s first black republic. Thus, Liberia’s 
electoral history can be catalogued into three phases. The first phase from independence in 1847 
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through to a military coup in 1980 is mostly the story of a de facto one-party state under the True 
Whig Party (TWP) for over a century from 1878 onward. Though some have demonstrated that 
elections during this period were more like “selections”—dominated by the TWP which in itself 
was populated predominantly with settlers from the US and Caribbean—they did occur relatively 
regularly.6  
 
The second phase involves two elections that took place under severely adverse conditions. In 
1985, Samuel Kanyon Doe, who had previously led a military coup and installed himself as head 
of state, allegedly rigged the election and “won” the presidential race amidst considerable 
violence and repression that precipitated armed conflicts spanning 1989 to 1996 and 1999 to 
2003.7 Separating the two sets of crises were elections in 1997 that took place in an insecure 
post-war environment. Rebel leader Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) won 
the polls by a large margin although the electoral playing field was significantly skewed.8  
 
The third and final phase encompasses the three post-war general elections to date. Almost 
incomparable to the first two phases, elections in the twenty-first century have been enormously 
competitive. For example, placing only second in the first presidential race of 2005, Sirleaf 
managed to leapfrog Weah in a run-off although her Unity Party (UP) failed to secure a majority 
in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. Weah’s party, the Congress for Democratic 
Change (CDC), became the largest in the House, but not the Senate. In 2011, Sirleaf was re-
elected under controversial circumstances. Her main opponent again was Weah, but this time as 
vice-standard bearer to Winston Tubman, nephew of Liberia’s longest serving president, William 
V.S. Tubman of the TWP. As runners-up in the first presidential race, Tubman and Weah alleged 
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irregularities and subsequently boycotted the run-off, thereby handing Sirleaf the presidency.9 
Whereas CDC’s numbers in the House reduced in 2011, UP emerged as the largest party in that 
body though it still fell short of a majority.   
 
While the 2005 and 2011 presidential, House, and Senate races set a precedent for remarkably 
open elections—with no party winning a majority in the House or Senate, the unanticipated 
victories of independents as well as candidates from smaller parties, and no clean presidential or 
legislative sweeps across any of Liberia’s 15 sub-political divisions, called counties—the 2017 
presidential and House polls amplified these trends.10 They resulted in wider representation 
across many different parties and independents as well as high levels of legislative turn-overs. 
Additionally, these polls brought forward political neophytes fronting parties as standard 
bearers,11 unprecedented numbers of party reconfigurations—with political mergers taking place 
at break-neck speed—increased levels of defections—with candidates either switching parties or 
dropping party affiliations altogether to run as independents—and politicians as well as parties 
losing abysmally in presumed ethno-regional bases. For example, whereas Weah’s political 
merger with his vice-presidential candidate Jewel Howard Taylor—senator of Liberia’s third 
most populous county, Bong, and former wife of warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor—
garnered him a decisive victory in the run-off with vice-president Joseph Boakai of the UP, his 
Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC+) neither won a majority in the House nor some of his 
reputed heartland counties in the Southeast nor Taylor’s supposed stronghold of Bong.12  
 
In this article, we argue that Weah’s triumph over a “pseudo incumbent”13 Boakai despite the 
modest showing of CDC+ in House races, coupled with the House wins of independents, smaller 
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and newer parties at the expense of established incumbents, are emblematic of complex trends 
that challenge ethno-regionalism as a primary explanation for politicians’ and voters’ electoral 
choices. While some scholars have argued for the continued primacy of ethno-regionalism in 
Africa, others have proffered coexisting motivations for electoral decision-making, including 
endogenous factors such as patronage and the policy and delivery performance of candidates 
(Sierra Leone), as well as exogenous factors such as international criminal trials (Kenya), the 
influence of China (Zambia), and transnational insecurity (Nigeria).14  
 
We expand the analysis further by contending that Liberia has existed in a post-war arena of 
“post-party” politics. Political parties are often still described as strong and healthy, generally, in 
which “party identification is an early-socialized, enduring, affective, psychological” attachment, 
and in Africa, where “party loyalty is unquestionably very high in many countries.”15 In contrast, 
the term “post-party” politics has recently come into use in a variety of circumstances, 
sometimes to explain the decline of a ruling party or system, for instance in China and Peru, or a 
collapse in trust of political parties, particularly in the so-called Global North, generally, and 
North America and Western Europe, more specifically.16 However, we define “post-party” 
politics in Liberia as more than weakened ruling parties or waning trust in parties, which have 
become evident in African countries such as Zambia, Senegal, Central African Republic, and 
Kenya.17 Instead, it is a profound disregard for parties altogether as the basic unit of analysis by 
both the electorate and politicians during election periods and from one election to the next. This 
is in sharp contrast not only to the continuing importance of political parties at a continental and 
global level but also to a century characterized by True Whig Party (TWP) hegemony in Liberia. 
Importantly, and at the same time, “post-party” politics is not accompanied in Liberia by voter 
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apathy but by an enthusiasm for participation in elections which manifests in a variety of modes 
of voter choice at both presidential and legislative levels and channels of representation other 
than through political parties. 
 
Whereas Afrobarometer data show 44%, 68% and 70% of Liberians in 2008 (Round 4), 2012 
(Round 5) and 2015 (Round 6), respectively, admitted feeling “close” to a particular political 
party, identification with parties has not necessarily translated into voting for those parties (in the 
case of the electorate) or maintaining strong candidate-party loyalties (in the case of 
politicians).18 We suggest that rather than upholding party loyalties, Liberian post-war voters and 
politicians engage in persistent and strategic forum shopping—a term used in legal scholarship to 
describe how people access justice by selecting the jurisdiction (forum/fora) likely to provide 
them with the most favourable outcome.19 Here we apply forum shopping to elections, from the 
perspective of politicians and voters, to demonstrate that regardless of how constrained their 
choices may be, Liberians possess varying levels of agency, thereby selecting in multiple 
electoral fora or platforms—ie, presidential, Senate, House races—candidates and/or political 
configurations they presume will deliver the best results at national, sub-national and local 
levels. Our findings show that Liberian politicians and voters view elections as high-stakes 
gambling, as articulated by this under-40 Monrovia-based man who admitted on voting day in 
October 2017 that “this thing [voting] is trial and error. We don’t know who be who.”20 In not 
knowing “who is who”, Liberian voters could be seen wearing layers of multiple party T-shirts 
and stripping them off one by one to feign loyalties when specific parties and politicians 
approached them with campaign paraphernalia. In a similar fashion, Liberian politicians 
systematically defected to increase their chances of winning. The party swapping by politicians 
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and symbolic discarding of T-shirts by voters is indicative of the fact that Liberians think of 
parties as disposable means to an end.  
 
Using quantitative analysis of 2017 election results as well as qualitative analysis of 35 semi-
structured pre-election interviews with voters, politicians, political party representatives, poll 
observers and radio journalists mostly in Montserrado and Grand Gedeh counties, we 
demonstrate in this article that “post-party” politics in Liberian elections derives from a form of 
forum shopping which has emerged from specific historical, political and socio-economic 
developments. Our detailed exploration of parties, their composition, supporters, and crucially 
those candidates who swing on a pendulum indicates an extraordinarily fluid political landscape. 
First, we outline a framework for understanding party politics in Liberia and consider how the 
country can be said to be in a state of “post-party” politics. We then explore why forum shopping 
is an appropriate framework for unearthing the electoral motivations of candidates and voters, 
thus demonstrating how it actually manifested in the 2017 race. And finally, we indicate why 
“post-party” politics and forum shopping are so rife in Liberia.  
 
Party Systems, Politics and (De-)consolidation in Africa  
 
Much of the literature on political parties in Africa and in particular their variable performances 
during elections has been concerned either with dominant party systems or fragmented party 
environments. Indeed, Mozaffar and Scarritt summarized this as the “low fragmentation and high 
volatility” of African party systems, evidenced by “the electoral and legislative dominance of a 
small number of large parties” and/or “large numbers of short-lived political parties.”21 One can 
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see what they mean. In countries like Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, the ruling party has officially won every post-
Cold War election and each party, barring in Cameroon and Uganda, has managed a leadership 
transition.22 They have often faced a large number of mostly ineffectual opposition parties as 
well as perhaps one main opponent who is nonetheless unlikely to emerge as winner.23  
 
At the end of the Cold War, some parties in economically and/or politically troubled one-party 
states, such as Benin, Malawi and Zambia, lost the first open elections, but many remained in 
power.24 Built into all explanations of this status quo is the ability of strong consolidated ruling 
parties to effectively use mostly presidential and often personalized political systems and 
advantages of incumbency—in particular the monopoly over or dominance in access to state 
resources often including infrastructure, security, electoral administration, funding and the 
media—as well as exploitation of the relative newness of democratic consolidation processes 
across Africa.25 For example, Crook wrote about the use of incumbency by the ruling party in 
1990s Côte d’Ivoire “to present itself as the organization most likely to be capable of putting 
together a winning coalition,” based not entirely but predominantly on ethno-regionalism and 
patronage.26  
 
To some extent, and in some states, these assumptions are challenged and occasionally 
opposition parties or coalitions have surmounted the considerable obstacles of non-incumbency. 
For example, Burnell suggested that Zambia in the 1990s and 2000s had transitioned from the 
Cold War era “de facto one-party state,” from which the ruling United National Independence 
Party (UNIP) was unseated in 1991, to a “predominant party system”.27 Notably, Zambia then 
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saw a second turnover at the ballot box in 2011. Important here is that Bwalya and Maharaj 
(2016) emphasize the circumstances of the incumbent political party in determining this result. 
No longer “predominant,” the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) experienced 
“sustained centrifugal conditions which systematically eroded the party’s strength” leading to a 
“public perception of…a decaying and recalcitrant party which increasingly detached itself from 
the electorate”.28 Remarkably, by the 2016 elections, both MMD and UNIP were marginal in 
their influence.29 Mirroring trends in Zambia, Benin, Ghana and Sierra Leone have had three 
turnovers, with Malawi and Senegal recording two.30 West Africa’s regional powerhouse Nigeria 
underwent its first electoral turnover in 2015 when the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
was defeated by a two-year-old “cobbled together” opposition party while Gambian president 
Yahya Jammeh and his party were forcefully encouraged by Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) leaders to abide by a 2016 opposition coalition victory.31 These 
examples indicate ruling parties are thus not as sturdy as once thought and may even disappear 
once a charismatic leader has gone.  
 
Indeed, while throngs of opposition parties in Africa still remain mostly ineffective or simply 
personalist vehicles, on occasions the opposition manages to organize better or coalesce from 
fragmentation to form, at least temporarily, a more effective proposition to overcome structural 
obstacles and take advantage of ruling party malaise. The case of Senegal is instructive here. 
From 1960 to 2000, the Parti socialiste (PS) successfully dominated Senegalese politics from 
within a multi-party democracy, a one-party state, and once again multi-partyism. According to 
Resnick, however, by the time of the second turnover in 2011-2012 across the board weaknesses 
in the party system generated “low levels of [party] institutionalization,” “limited ability of the 
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opposition to mobilize key constituencies,” “party de-alignment,” and low voter turnout, with 
personalities becoming much more important in voter choices.32 PS was defeated in 2001 
following the unseating of its leader, Abdou Diouf, as president in 2000 and boycotted the 2007 
elections.33 It is, again remarkably, now a marginal force. Its successor, the Sopi Coalition, was 
in turn defeated in 2012 following the downfall of leader Abdoulaye Wade as president.34 
 
In 2017, Liberia’s UP suffered a defeat and adds itself to the list of African ruling parties that 
have been ousted. To be clear, UP’s ejection is not analogous to the electoral removal of a ruling 
party in neighbouring Sierra Leone where either of the two main parties can maintain their 
coherence and status as opposition once defeated; Liberia, we argue, is the site of a much more 
fractured party system and electorate. While the fate of the UP remains to be seen in the wake of 
Sirleaf’s presidential exit, this article takes the notions of breakdown of ruling parties as in 
Zambia and the fragmentation of party systems as in Senegal a step further, by centring voters 
and politicians alike as strategic forum shoppers in an increasingly fluid electoral environment.  
 
Finally, as in the cases of Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire mentioned previously, ethno-regionalism is 
often central to explanations of African election results even when considered alongside other 
factors.35 Our investigation suggests, however, that voters and politicians in Liberia possess 
various and seemingly contradictory motivations that do not centre on ethnicity or region. This 
fits within a constructivist understanding of identity whereby the performance of ethnicity is seen 
as fluctuating over time and space and subject to political, societal and geographic pressures 
which affect the way an individual may act with respect to her/his ethnicity or overlapping 
ethnicities.36 
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Forum Shopping as Electoral Choice  
 
In forum shopping (also known as venue shopping) a plaintiff is an agent of her/his own making 
with the capacity to strategically select a court or legal jurisdiction that s/he deems capable of 
rendering the most favourable/advantageous judgment/outcome over her/his opponent, in cases 
as varied as those involving land disputes, intellectual property and trademark claims, human 
rights violations, patents, labour standards, and chemicals regulations.37 In instances where more 
than one court has legal jurisdiction over the case, plaintiffs may choose particular fora because 
they are known to be “plaintiff-friendly,” rendering judgments speedily, requiring little to no 
transaction costs, and providing larger damage rewards.38 In a similar fashion, Liberian 
politicians and voters operate in an arena of heightened competition whereby politicians shop 
around for parties and coalitions in multiple electoral fora, and voters feel increasingly 
empowered to select candidates representing different parties or standing as independents in 
diverse venues—presidential-national, Senate-subnational and House-local races. Whereas some 
politicians and voters personified a rationalist theory of politics by tactically positioning 
themselves to guarantee micro-level, personal victory at the polls, others admitted to making 
electoral choices based on national, sub-national and local considerations, such as the 
maintenance of Liberia’s fragile peace.  
 
Thus, forum shopping provides an “elaborate set of options,” a kind of checks and balances 
particularly for the poor, weak and disaffected. In effect, it prevents one forum from possessing a 
monopoly of power, be it in executive-national or legislative-subnational/local elections in the 
Liberia case, informal village institutions or more formal courts in other cases.39 For example, 
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using survey data of over 4,500 legal disputes judged in both customary and statutory institutions 
in Liberia, Sandefeur and Siddiqi employed the term forum shopping to describe how poor rural 
citizens make strategic although constrained choices in maneuvering a dual legal system, and 
that while customary law is the preferred forum because of its low-cost emphasis on “remedies” 
and reconciliation, those likely to experience negative bias in the customary system (ie, women, 
ethnic minorities) are more prone to select formal statutory law—with its emphasis on “rights”—
to adjudicate their cases.40  Where Liberia is concerned, scholars have demonstrated repeatedly 
that while formal courts tend to structurally favour those with financial, social and political 
capital, customary institutions seemingly enable those lacking money, personal connections or 
political clout to seek—and secure—legal recourse in a consistent, predictable, transparent, fair 
and affordable forum, especially in cases where the parties are from the same community.41  
 
Although it has been used in legal terms primarily, forum shopping is an apt phrase for 
describing the state of play in different electoral venues in Liberia. In the same way plurality of 
options is the bedrock of a sound electoral democracy, the bedrock of forum shopping is the 
multiplicity of choices, though finite. This is emblematic of how Liberian voters, on average, 
have participated in post-war elections at executive and legislative levels; it is also increasingly 
indicative of how politicians select particular political configurations or join coalitions from 
which to launch their careers or expand their constituencies. Equally, politicians’ forum shopping 
tendencies are hardly confined to Liberia, however Liberian examples are particularly acute.  
 
In the sections that follow, we provide concrete examples of how forum shopping and “post-
party” politics actually manifested in Liberia’s 2017 presidential and House races.  
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Forum Shopping and “Post-party” Politics in Liberia: Two Sides of the Same Coin  
 
There are at least two ways of looking at forum shopping and “post-party” politics in Liberia and 
in particular the lack of serious consideration for political parties in twenty-first century 
electioneering: from the perspective of voters and politicians.  
 
While forum shoppers select jurisdictions based on published court judgments previously 
rendered42, Liberian voters in particular are motivated less by parties and more by a candidate’s 
symbolism and evidence of a perceived or proven track record of success and delivery in the 
public and/or private spheres at executive and legislative levels. In particular, voters interviewed 
in Monrovia appeared less swayed by party loyalties and more inclined to forum shop for 
presidential candidates whom they presumed would have Liberia “at heart”.43 For instance, in 
Weah’s stronghold of vote-rich Montserrado County, where the capital Monrovia lies, support 
for him as an athlete turned statesman appeared more robust than support for his CDC+.44 While 
some voters lauded Weah for his accessibility, neutrality and humanitarianism during Liberia’s 
armed conflict, others suggested that his youthful outlook and humble beginnings would make 
him more empathetic to the poor, young and disaffected, like themselves.  
 
However, not all Monrovia-based voters were enamoured with Weah’s rags to riches story. For 
instance, interviews with two under-40 entrepreneurs revealed that, despite zero allegiance to the 
Alternative National Congress (ANC), both intended to cast ballots for political newcomer and 
ANC standard bearer Alexander Cummings because they argued that he would be a better 
candidate for reversing Liberia’s spiral into recession given his private sector managerial profile 
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and promises to improve the ease of doing business in the country.45 While some Liberians 
lauded Cummings’ commitments to increase the country’s revenue base through privatization 
and curbing government waste, others remained wary of his transnationalism and lack of public 
service experience, thereby opting instead for veteran politicians who had much longer records 
of political engagement. For instance, one 30-year-old researcher admitted that although he knew 
his was a “wasted” vote he still intended to cast a ballot for the Liberian People Party’s H. Boima 
Fahnbulleh, former national security advisor, because he espoused socialist ideals and would 
likely challenge the neoliberal, capitalist model of development adopted and sustained by 
Sirleaf.46  
 
There are also countless examples of voters’ forum shopping at the legislative level. First, there 
is the spread of representation across the country, as indicated by Table 1. The number of House 
seats held by small parties and incumbents continues to be very high. Although the two main 
parties/coalitions, UP and CDC+, have a greater grip on the House than in previous elections 
with 41 seats between them—20 for UP and 21 for CDC+, compared in 2011 to 24 for UP and 
11 for CDC and in 2005 to eight for UP and 15 for CDC—neither is yet remotely close to a 
majority. Small political parties (those with less than 3% of the vote or no representation in the 
presidential/vice-presidential race) have eight seats combined (LTP, LPP, MDR, VCP, UPP, 
MOVEE, LINU) with some parties only recording single seats. Remarkably, the number of 
independents in the House rose from nine in 2011 to 13 in 2017. It is important to note here that 
unlike votes derived at the legislative level which operates as a first-past-the-post, simple 
majority system tending to favour independents, votes garnered at the presidential level must be 
absolute majority (50% +1%) and as such it would be more difficult for a presidential candidate 
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to win on an independent ticket. Nevertheless, despite the Liberian government being executive 
heavy and there being just two main parties/coalitions realistically vying for the presidency, there 
is an inordinate number of other players. This is emblematic of voters responding strategically to 
the plurality of electoral options available to them in national, subnational and local venues. 
 
Table 1: House results by party wins 
County/ 
Party 
CDC+ UP IND PUP LP ALP MDR LTP LINU LPP MOVEE UPP VCP 
Lofa  3 2           
Gbarpolu 2  1           
Grand Cape 
Mount 
1  1  1         
Bomi 1 1  1          
Montserrado 8 3 5     1      
Bong 1 2 1 1  2        
Margibi 2 1 1       1    
Grand Bassa 1 2 2           
Nimba 1 2  3   2      1 
River Cess  1   1         
Sinoe  3            
Grand 
Gedeh 
1  1         1  
River Gee  1    1     1   
Grand Kru     1    1     
Maryland 2 1            
              
TOTAL 21 20 13 5 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: National Elections Commission of Liberia 
 
Unlike counterparts in neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone and Ghana—who in some 
regions vote conspicuously on ethno-regional party lines47—Liberian voters in 2017 blocked the 
top three parties from dominating across House and presidential races in supposed heartlands. 
For example, although the UP took three of five seats in Boakai’s home county of Lofa, the party 
won only one seat in Bomi, Sirleaf's home county, and no seats at all in Gbarpolu County where 
the UP candidate won the first-round presidential races in both 2011 and 2017. Indeed, UP 
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dropped from three seats to one in Bomi and Margibi counties, but increased from one to three in 
Sinoe County in the Southeast. Again, although CDC+ increased its total from seven to nine out 
of 17 seats in Montserrado (down from an original eight in 2012 following the death of CDC’s 
Tandapolie and the victory of UP’s Nyenka in a by-election) and held onto six of these seats 
from 2011, the Coalition won just one seat in Taylor’s home county, Bong; one in Grand Gedeh 
County where Weah polled 75% in the first-round presidential race in 201748; and no seats in the 
Southeastern counties of Sinoe (71.5% in the presidential race), River Gee (59.8% in the 
presidential race) and Grand Kru (63.5% in the presidential race). As in 2005 and 2011, there 
were no clean sweeps in 2017 of legislative and presidential polls by any party in any county. 
During a particularly ironic by-election in November 2018 emblematic of forum shopping and 
“post-party” politics, CDC+ subsequently lost a Montserrado representative seat to a former 
CDC partisan turned independent.49 However, ruling parties typically lose seats in mid- rather 
than start-of-term elections; they certainly do not lose seats held for 12 years to independents.  
 
If the story is transferred to supposed non-heartlands, the patterns remain puzzling as a 
comparison of Tables 1 and 2 demonstrates. CDC+ has one seat in Nimba County where Weah 
has never polled well and amassed just 8% of the first-round vote for president in 2017, as 
indicated in Table 2. UP took all three seats in Sinoe County where Boakai mustered only 12.9% 
and two seats in Grand Bassa County where he gathered just 9.2%. Similarly, LP won one of 
three seats in Grand Kru County where Brumskine polled 5% in the presidential race. Indeed, it 
is hard to identify a part of the country which is either dominated by or highly unpromising for 
the main political parties in the 2017 polls, or indeed those in 2011 and 2005. 
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Lofa 7 78.5 5.2 0.6 2.1 
Gbarpolu 37.7 41.5 4.3 3.3 4.2 
Grand Cape Mount 39.3 36 5.5 1.2 5.3 
Bomi 41.1 36.2 5.5 0.5 7.5 
Montserrado 48.6 27.3 7.1 1.6 10.4 
Bong 40.6 34 5.2 1.5 5.5 
Margibi 43.6 26.9 13.7 1.4 6.8 
Grand Bassa 27.1 9.2 50.2 1.1 2.6 
Nimba 8 19.9 4.5 53.5 6.2 
River Cess 39.6 10.7 35.7 1.3 2.8 
Sinoe 71.5 12.9 1.7 1.5 2.1 
Grand Gedeh 75 9.7 3.7 2.7 1.9 
River Gee 59.8 16 4.5 2.6 5.2 
Grand Kru 63.5 13.7 5 3.1 3.9 
Maryland 47.8 12.5 5.7 0.6 21.6 
      
TOTAL 38.4 28.8 9.6 8.2 7.2 
Source: National Elections Commission of Liberia 
 
Crucially, established political parties held onto just 19 seats in the House post-November 2018 
by-elections, all of which were held by larger parties/coalitions: 10 for UP, eight for CDC+ and 
one for LP. In addition, three candidates held their seats as independents, thus bringing the total 
number of holds under the same political banner to 22—just 30.1% of the seats in the House. 
Change of party or incumbent occurred in a total of 55 of 73 seats from 2011 to 2018 (This does 
not include the two independents-Pennue and Barchue—who did not represent a party). Based on 
these findings, we can safely say that the post-war Liberian electorate votes on the basis of 
criteria other than party affiliation and forum shopping is ubiquitous.  
 
From the perspective of politicians, although the act of floor crossing or forum shopping is not 
unusual in Africa or around the globe, it seems to have become a prominent feature of post-war 
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Liberian politics. At the leadership level, it showed no signs of abating in 2017. Boakai has 
always been UP during his time in office and Weah has until now been the opposition leader for 
the same party, CDC, but those around them have shifted dramatically. For instance, Emmanuel 
Nuquay had been a Representative in the House for UP from 2005, but after re-election in 2011 
left UP to form PUP. In 2017, he came full circle and became the vice-presidential standard 
bearer for the UP’s Boakai, who in the process selected Nuquay for a variety of political reasons 
that completely sidelined party stalwarts. Perhaps most remarkably, Sirleaf was widely assumed 
in 2017 to have joined other UP devotees like Gbehzohngar Milton Findley and Toga Gayewea 
McIntosh in putting her weight behind Weah rather than Boakai and despite denials she was 
subsequently expelled from UP.50 
 
At the level of rank and file politicians, forum shopping patterns continue. In the 2017 polls, a 
remarkable 31 of 3851 incumbents in the House of Representatives ran for different parties than 
those they had stood for in prior elections; the remaining seven changed from independent status 
to representing a party. Although one of these incumbents went from party (NPP) to coalition 
(CDC+) and two others went from coalition (APD) to two parties formerly of that coalition (LPP 
and UPP), the 38 incumbents together represented over half (52%) of the 73 members of the 
House. With nine incumbents not standing in 2017, this left just 26 representatives (35.6%) 
under a consistent party affiliation.  
 
The examples detailed herein demonstrate how “post-party” politics and forum shopping—as 
two sides of the same coin—proved simultaneously favourable and unfavourable to voters and 
politicians alike in the same electoral cycle. It is of course undeniable that parties still exist and 
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are in some ways still useful but it is their severe downgrading as political vehicles for politicians 
and voters which is extraordinary. In the two case studies that follow, we explore more deeply 
how forum shopping and “post-party” politics enhanced the clout of a thrice elected 
representative while severely hobbling the aspirations of a thrice defeated presidential contender.  
 
How “Cow Kill the Lion” 
 
One particular case at the legislative level in Grand Gedeh County exemplifies “post-party” 
politics and forum shopping. Zoe Pennue is one of three surviving House legislators from 2005 
and the only independent candidate (under a consistent independent affiliation) to win all three 
post-war legislative elections, and by a substantial margin in District 1 in 2005 (57.9%) and 
District 2 in 2011 (57.1%) and 2017 (55.7%).52 Although he contested the Grand Gedeh Senate 
race in 2014 and only garnered a second-place finish, Pennue returned to win the House seat in 
2017 well above another independent, Jeremiah Garwo Sokan, who gained only 20.8% of the 
vote.53  
 
The battle between Pennue and Sokan was partly symbolic. The cow has long been Pennue’s 
emblem while Sokan chose a lion. In an upending of the power hierarchy in the animal kingdom, 
the slogan “cow kill the lion” was often heard and reported.54 While both men have Krahn 
ancestry, the dominant ethnic group in Grand Gedeh, the race partly boiled down to perceptions 
about experience and “rootedness”.55 Whereas Pennue has been representative since 2005 and 
played a part in the rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) to 
oust former President Taylor from 1999-2003, Sokan, previously deputy minister of planning 
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and national coordinator for the climate change secretariat, had spent considerable time in the 
United States.56  
 
These factors played a part in Pennue’s victory, however the main message from officials at the 
campaign office was what Pennue had done in a very direct sense, from paying school fees and 
hospitals bills to donating cars.57 One narrative held that Pennue has long supported the Grand 
Gedeh County football club, in particular when the financially troubled team progressed to third 
place in the National County Meet in 2013-2014.58 Contrary to the symbolism and personality of 
Weah at the presidential level, Pennue’s legislative largesse resembles markers of patronage, 
whether aimed at communities or individuals; however, he clearly does not need party money or 
infrastructure to secure victories in the House. Indeed, it may sometimes be the reverse. Another 
narrative reveals that Sirleaf postponed a visit to Grand Gedeh because Pennue was on one of his 
many trips abroad and she needed his support.59 Within an environment of weakly consolidated 
parties where Pennue could conceivably better forum shop outside of party strictures, there is 
also an electorate willing to forum shop at the ballot box bolstered in Pennue’s case by stories, 
whether true or false, of his generosity and linkages abroad. At the same time, as noted 
previously, while Weah won 75% of the votes in the first-round presidential race in Grand 
Gedeh, CDC+ secured only one seat thus contributing to a “post-party” environment in the 
county. 
 
Shopping Forums for LP  
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One stark example of forum shopping and “post-party” politics can be seen at the presidential 
level, with the waning influence of the LP and its now late former standard bearer Charles 
Brumskine. After three failed presidential campaigns, the LP seems weaker now than it was in 
2011 when Brumskine came in only fourth place after securing fewer votes than the MDR’s 
Prince Johnson, a warlord-turned-senator who lacked any campaign machinery to back him in 
the 2017 race.60  
 
Brumskine’s LP began to visibly unravel at the seams early on in the campaign trail, when he 
was rumoured to have been receiving financial and strategic support from Sirleaf.61 The 
LP/Brumskine-Sirleaf alliance hearsay was further substantiated in the eyes of the electorate 
when stalwarts of the UP crossed the political carpet over to LP—including Harrison Karnwea, 
former forestry development authority managing director, who became LP’s vice-presidential 
candidate, and Musa Bility, a wealthy entrepreneur and former president of the Liberia Football 
Association, who became LP’s lead campaign chief executive officer.62 Karnwea’s abrupt 
political marriage with Brumskine is said to have been brokered by Sirleaf63 when Boakai 
refused to take him on as a vice-presidential candidate, so he forum shopped and selected LP as 
the party that he thought could deliver him the most favourable outcome. In the same way that 
Karnwea and Bility forum shopped, so too did LP by embracing the two ex-UP loyalists.  
 
What placed the nail in LP’s political coffin was that after losing its case against the National 
Elections Commission to annul the 2017 presidential election results, after a contentious six-
week court battle, in a show of betrayal against Brumskine some LP high-level executives—
including Karnwea, Bility and national chairman Benjamin Sanvee—snubbed the party’s official 
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position of neutrality and instead publicly endorsed, in their personal capacities, Weah for the 
run-off against Boakai. By going against LP’s standard bearer and the official party stance, the 
three LP executives engaged in forum shopping tactics by allying themselves early on with the 
party that they believed would win the election.64 In the same way that LP politicians forum 
shopped by crossing over to other parties to gain favour, so too did LP voters forum shop in the 
2017 legislative race by not electing LP. For example, LP won no seats in Grand Bassa, a 
presumed heartland and where Brumskine came first in the 2017 presidential first round with 
50% of the vote and where the LP had swept all House races in 2005. In many ways, a once 
reasonably strong ethno-regional party has been undone by forum shopping.  
 
Post-elections, forum shopping is still in public view with LP partisans purposefully aligning 
with President Weah. For example, LP partisan and Grand Kru representative J. Fonati Koffa, 
former chairman of the LP, officially joined the CDC+ in August 2018 in a further consolidation 
of the ruling party’s political base.65 The crossing over of UP executives to LP and then from LP 
to CDC+ is a clear example that politicians too forum shop, selecting platforms that they believe 
will deliver them the most decisive victory, or at the very least the most favourable outcome.   
 
In the concluding analysis that follows, we explain why forum shopping and “post-party” politics 





In this article, we have argued that while plaintiffs may forum shop for a favourable court or 
legal jurisdiction, Liberian voters and politicians forum shop in various electoral venues for 
candidates and/or political outfits likely to serve national, sub-national and local level interests. 
For voters, these interests do not appear to have ethno-regionalism as a priority and instead 
include calculations on which politicians provide the most convincing personal/political histories 
and delivery promises for individual, community or nation at each electoral venue. For 
politicians, there is significant forum shopping between parties which again belies the idea that 
ethno-regionalism is of primary concern. However, this electoral environment has not developed 
within a vacuum. There are particular historical and socio-economic reasons forum shopping and 
“post-party” politics feature prominently in Liberia’s post-war electoral milieu which make our 
findings quite specific.  
 
First, unlike some African countries where parties have crystalized out of liberation struggles 
and/or endured since independence—as in the cases of South Africa or Sierra Leone—the 
majority of twenty-first century political parties in Liberia are relatively new and therefore 
unconsolidated. The historical trajectory of political parties is useful to recount here. For 
example, although the once-dominant TWP still exists it has gained no seats in the House or 
Senate since the end of the armed conflict in 2003. Doe’s former party, the National Democratic 
Party of Liberia (NDPL), won one House and two Senate seats in 2005, lost them all in 
subsequent elections in 2011 and 2014, respectively, and was not registered in 2017.66 Two other 
longstanding parties, the Liberian People’s Party (LPP) and the United People’s Party (UPP) date 
back to the 1970s and continue to play small roles in elections and gain a few seats each time, 
separately or in alliances.67 Whereas the vast majority of current parties are products of the war 
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or post-war political configurations—like the NPP and CDC—the UP represents the only pre-
war party that has remained relevant since the advent of multi-party democracy in the 1980s. The 
UP is probably now the most consolidated party but in comparison to a very weak field and now 
confined to opposition.  
 
Second, the 2005 elections followed a two-year all-inclusive National Transitional Government 
of Liberia (NTGL) which mandated that no one serving as chairman, vice-chairman, chief 
justice, associate justice, speaker, deputy speaker or principal cabinet minister could stand for 
elected office.68 In the absence of incumbents, there was an enviable levelness to the electoral 
playing field and a high degree of competition. Liberia also received substantial assistance to 
facilitate these conditions, although high administrative overhead and exorbitant payments to 
foreign interveners in particular consumed the financial resources allotted for democracy 
promotion and peacekeeping.69 Third, Liberia’s first-past-the-post, or simple majority, electoral 
system at the legislative level and large numbers of candidates allow some to win with small vote 
totals, thereby potentially aiding independents and small parties.  
 
Fourth, there are little to no ideological differences that distinguish one party from the next, with 
policy pronouncements broadly promising socio-economic change. Lastly, and most importantly, 
politicians increasingly perceive winning elections as a conduit for amassing personal wealth 
given the lucrative nature of holding public office in Liberia.70 This, in turn, has created an 
increasingly demanding electorate which views polls as a forum for both eliminating self-
interested opportunists and rewarding would-be public servants who can devise and deliver 
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practical solutions to the country’s grim socio-economic outlook and/or benefits for their 
communities.  
 
Nevertheless, while “post-party” politics and forum shopping in Liberia buck the general trend 
across Africa, there are elements of the country’s political environment that make it similar to 
other parts of the continent. For example, some parties’ shallow historical roots and the absence 
of acute ideological differences amongst parties figure elsewhere in Africa. Thus, we believe our 
conclusions are worthy of wider consideration and contribution to debates in African politics. 
Although literature exploring electoral trends in Africa tends to over-emphasize ethno-
regionalism as a driver and constraint in the choices of voters and politicians, we have 
demonstrated in this article instead that Liberians make relatively informed, strategic decisions 
about political alliances and ballot casting thereby subverting allegiances to ethnicity and region. 
By further eschewing party loyalties, Liberians have gradually become astute forum shoppers in 
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